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The Malaysian government’s approach to soft nationalisation through the New Economic 
Policy did not involve coerced sale of foreign investments in the country. The Government 
formulated its policy on an ‘expanding cake’ theory, where the prospect of gains from 
economic growth would be offset by the loss of control by the sale of equity to local and 
indigenous investors. This study examines the complex corporate divestment undertaken by a 
major foreign-owned agency house in Malaysia, the Barlow Boustead Estates Agency (BBEA) 
in response to the New Economic Policy. Documents in the Barlow family archive at the 
University of Cambridge reveal how the Malaysian government’s policy of reducing foreign 
ownership in the economy led to competition among foreign investors to retain ownership up 
to the allowable limits. Such competition created an unattractive environment for foreign 
capital and eventually led to ‘default nationalisation’. The owners of BBEA were eventually 
opted to sell to Government-backed institutional investors, although they had no legal 
obligation to do so.  
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The nationalisation of foreign owned businesses under Malaysia’s New Economic 
Policy (NEP), the affirmative action programme has received a lot of attention among 
scholars (Gomez 2009; Gomez and Jomo 1999). However, how foreign owners reacted and 
took decisions to comply with the nationalisation rules of ownership has been scarce in the 
extant literature. This study contributes to such a lacuna by examining the sale of one of the 
major foreign owned agency houses in Malaysia, the Barlow Boustead Estates Agency 
(BBEA).  
BBEA was initially established in 1966 as a jointly owned entity between two foreign 
partners, namely the Barlow family based in London owning 65 per cent of the equity and the 
Boustead Group, a British owned firm based in Singapore owning the remaining shares. 
BBEA responded to the Malaysianisation1 policy by selling 30 per cent of their shares to 
three Malaysian government approved local institutions in 1974, FELDA, Tabung Tentera 
and Tabung Haji which each bought a 10 per cent stake. This resulted in the Barlows and the 
Boustead Group’s stake being reduced to 45 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. In a bid to 
take majority control of BBEA in 1979, the Boustead Group which was also Malaysianised 
by then, managed to persuade the three Malaysian Institutions to consider swapping their 
respective stakes in BBEA for shares in Boustead. This would have made the Bousteads 
majority owners of BBEA and left the Barlows with a minority stake of 22.5 per cent. This 
move caught the Barlows by surprise and led to significant tension with the Boustead Group. 
From 1979 to 1982 a number of potential deals emerged as the Barlows attempted to 
maintain control of the firm, but to no avail. In 1982 they sold up to the Malaysian 
 
1 This paper will use the term Malaysianisation to refer to the process of the sale of equity shares in foreign-
owned businesses to Malaysians and Malaysian investment funds. This process is variously referred to 
‘Malaysianisation’, ‘Malaysian Participation’, ‘Bumiputranisation’ and ‘Bumiputra Participation.’ 
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institutions and the Bousteads, escaping the challenging investment climate the government 
inadvertently had created.   
This paper departs from previous studies of the New Economic Policy and 
Malaysianisation in its detailed consideration of the actions taken by a single firm in response 
to Government policy changes. This study has been made possible by access to the personal 
and business correspondence of the Barlow family covering this period. The files, archived at 
Cambridge University Library and Cambridge University’s Centre for South Asian Studies, 
include accounts, memorandums, notes, letters and minutes of private meetings that took 
place between 1968 and 1983.  
These files have allowed the authors of this paper to combine the widely known 
economic and political events in Malaysian with the private thoughts and responses of the 
investors who felt their consequences. This paper analyses the interplay between foreign 
investors and Malaysian officials from the perspective of the Barlow Boustead Estates 
Agency, and as such, tells the story of how the Agency went through a series of changes that 
would eventually end with Barlow divestment and a restructuring of the Barlow Group away 
from Malaysia. We seek to use the new level of detail available to us to answer the question: 
‘How did individual investors respond to the policy of Malaysianisation?’. In doing so, the 
paper contributes to an understanding of the motivations of a complex corporate divestment 
decision with an interplay of both politics and economics.  
It will be seen how the soft approach to nationalisation increased competition amongst 
foreign investors by reducing their share of ownership in the economy. This competition was 
further intensified by the policy of allowing foreign investors to ‘cash out’ and take the 
money made in nationalisation out of the Malaysian economy, meaning that some were 
prepared to sell their shares at a discount. Accompanied by the strong track record of the 
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Malaysian Government in running plantations businesses profitably, this led to a split among 
investors, with some divesting and others competing to retain ownership up to the allowable 
limits of the remaining share of the pie. This intense competition created an unattractive 
investment climate and eventually led to foreign divestment. We term this emergent process 
‘default nationalisation’.  
The sections that follow start with a description of the NEP in more detail, from its 
conception to its implementation, and a history of Barlow Boustead Estates Agency. The 
paper is then structured around the key decisions taken by the Barlows as they responded to 
the NEP, providing details of the context of each decisions and the discussing how the 
intended outcomes differed from those realised. Finally, the paper concludes by discussing 
the above research question in light of the new information provided by the events at the 
Agency. 
The New Economic Policy and the Malaysian Business Environment 
The NEP was introduced in 1971 following the racially charged riots in May 1969 
following a general election where Malaysia’s national opposition parties won a significant 
share of seats in parliament. The NEP rang the changes for the Government’s attitude to 
foreign business, introducing requirements for employment of and ownership by ethnic 
Malaysians, also known as bumiputras.2 The changes were implemented over a period of 
more than a decade, with a final target for implementation of 30 per cent Malaysian 
ownership in the economy by 1990. Post-independence in 1957, the Government of Malaya3 
adopted a policy of accommodation to foreign ownership of businesses in the rubber, palm 
 
2 Bumiputra is a term used to describe Malays and other indigenous peoples of Malaysia. 
3 The country was known as Malaya from its independence in 1957 till the formation of Malaysia with Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore joining the federation. Singapore became an independent state in 1965 when it was 
expelled from the Federation of Malaysia. 
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oil and mining industries. This policy was partly driven by the leaders of United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling coalition not wanting to 
limit the influence of foreign firms for the fear that the Chinese would gain control of the 
economy with the retreat of foreign capital (Gomez 2009). 
There is a substantial body of literature regarding the details of the economic policy of 
Malaysia post-independence. For example, Shakila Yacob and Nicholas White’s article on 
the infamous Guthrie ‘Dawn Raid’ in 1981, where the Malaysian Government supported the 
purchase of a controlling share in Guthrie on the London Stock Exchange.4  Other articles 
have considered the impact of the New Economic Policy on foreign investors in Malaysia at 
an aggregate level. Thillainathan and Cheong discuss the impact of reduced foreign 
investment on inequality5, and Yacob and Khalid consider the success level of investors that 
chose to adapt to the policy and remain in Malaysia, rather than to divest.6 Given the high 
quality extant literature this paper will not attempt to repeat the full details of the NEP, 
instead this section provides an overview in the context of its impact on Barlow Boustead 
Estates Agency.  
Previously a collection of smaller states, settlements and colonies, Malaysia (at that 
point known as Malaya) gained independence as a united country on the 31st August 1957. 
Despite this political independence, the country could be characterised as an "economic 
colony" at this time. British and other European investors controlled much of the land and 
large shares of many of the high value industries, with the indigenous Bumiputra and Malay 
population relegated to minority shareholders in most of their own economy. To this end, the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced by prime minister Tun Abdul Razak. The 
 
4 Yacob and White (2010). 
5 Thillainathan and Cheong (2016). 
6 Yacob and Khalid (2012). 
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primary policy objective of the NEP came in the form of the Second Malaysia Plan which 
stated that economic ownership must transition to the ratio 30:40:30 Bumiputra, other 
Malaysian (although there were many nationalities of resident Malaysian, the Chinese 
investors had significantly the largest share ownership in the economy) and Foreign 
respectively. In 1970 this ratio was 3:33:63 averaged across the whole economy. One of the 
key architects of this plan, Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman, explained that the growth in local 
ownership was expected to come from an overall growth in the Malaysian economy, thus the 
Second Malaysia Plan could not be regarded as a threat to the prospects of foreign business 
owners in Malaysia. Chairman of the National Investment Corporation (known as 
PERNAS)7, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, said of the plan: 
So long as Bumiputras are bystanders and mere members of the audience there is a 
situation that is not conducive to the stability of the country. We cannot devise a 
scheme to achieve our objectives that will please everybody. However, the schemes 
we have devised will not affect either the feeling of the local people or frighten away 
foreign investment.8 
Under the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh, PERNAS represented the Malaysian 
government's main vehicle for increasing participation in the economy. Using loans from the 
government and foreign and local banks, the state-owned corporation was to purchase shares 
in large, foreign-owned businesses. It was then expected that income from these investments 
cover the finance charges on loans and build capital for further investments.  
 
7 New Straits Times (1997) 
8 Cambridge University (CU) Centre for South Asia Studies (CSAS) Barlow 74/2: Transcript of an interview 





The government also provided mechanisms for individual Malaysian investors to 
participate through the establishment of state-owned investment funds. These included 
Tabung Haji (The Pilgrims' Fund) and Tabung Tentera9 (The Military Pension Fund). As 
Torii10 notes, there was disagreement inside the Malaysian government over how to pursue 
increased participation in the economy. The prime-minister and chief architect of the NEP, 
Tun Razak, preferred a policy of increased participation through employment and 
participation in trade, however Tengku Razaleigh favoured a policy of equity participation 
and land ownership. This lack of alignment at the highest levels of the NEP caused foreign-
owned businesses to delay their response. This is clear from exchanges between the 
Bumiputra Participation Unit (BPU, a government agency) and the Malaysian International 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI). The MICCI represented the interests of 
private foreign businesses, especially British, in lobbying the Malaysian government. Writing 
to the MICCI and referring the attitude of foreign private businesses to participation, the BPU 
noted: 
The response from the private sector is not so encouraging... there is only an adequate 
response from the new ventures which are very competitive and yet to make their 
foothold in the market. This indicates that the private sector is more keen to share the 
liability with the Bumiputra and not the credit.11 
The BPU goes on to call on the MICCI to make sure the private sector is "acquainted with the 
objectives of the policy". In answer to the accusations of the BPU, the MICCI responded with 
a letter quoting a speech from Tun Razak in 1971, when the policy was first announced: 
 
9Also referred to as Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera or LTAT 
10 Torii (1997). 
11 CU CSAS Barlow 73/2: Quoted in a reply from the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce (MICC) 
to Tun Razak on 26/12/1973 
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We take our cue from the statement made by the Hon'ble Prime Minister... on 12th 
July 1971 which he said, ‘The rights, properties and privileges now belonging to 
whichever group or individual will not be taken away and given to others. What is 
envisaged by the Government is that newly created opportunities will be distributed in 
a just and equitable manner.’"12 
This exchange is typical of the communication between the MICCI and the BPU at the time, 
and demonstrates the lack of a common position within the government on how to achieve 
the objectives of the NEP. The result is that British businesses attempted to delay taking steps 
towards equity participation in their core business, whilst constructing new ventures to 
deliver growth and appease the government. On 29th January, 1974, the MICCI held a 
"Discussion on Bumiputra Participation" with Chief Executives of member companies. In a 
summary of the events of the forum, the MICCI noted: 
Progress must take place and be seen to be taking place. Any idea of leaving things 
until 1989 is just 'not on'. ...The government is clearly under the impression that many 
businesses are paying mere 'lip-service' to its policies. 13 
Between 1973 and 1974, the Malaysian government conducted a mid-term review of 
the NEP which led to the finding mentioned above, that foreign businesses were not engaging 
with the policy. This appears to lead to a change in direction of the Malaysian Government 
and the BPU, focusing instead on an “expanding cake” theory of participation. Rather than 
seeking to push foreign businesses into sharing ownership, the BPU explained how the value 
of foreign shares could still grow, even whilst local participation increased: 
 
12 CU CSAS Barlow 73/2: Letter from the MICCI to Tun Razak 26/12/1973 




The expansion of shares to Malays and other indigenous people... will involve a 
sizeable decline in the share of foreign interests. The value of shares held by 
foreigners, however, will grow at a relatively high rate and lead to a share capital 
holding by them in 1990 which is about five times more than in 1970.14 
Assertions from the BPU that investors could still make money whilst complying with 
the NEP, as well as increased pressure on the MICCI to ensure compliance of members, 
eventually led to the MICCI recommending that all members make "a blue-print for 
participation and submit it in confidence to the BPU". Although the NEP had been in place 
since 1971, March of 1974 can be considered the beginning of active efforts by foreign 
businesses to comply with the policy.  
This section sought to provide a brief introduction to the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and the Second Malaysia Plan, and to explain the environment that foreign investors 
were operating in from 1974 onwards. These investors faced pressure from the Government, 
via the Bumiputra Participation Unit (BPU) to increase the participation of 
indigenous Malaysians in their business on several fronts; through employment, through 
greater trade and through equity ownership. At the same time, the Government predicted 
significant growth in Malaysian GDP (6.5 per cent on average between 1970 and 1990) that 
would allow the value of foreign investment to grow, even whilst participation targets were 
met, in what was dubbed the “expanding cake” theory of participation.  
The Barlow Boustead Estates Agency, a History 
The Barlows were one of several British families with significant business interests in 
Malaysia and other locations in South East Asia since the 1910s, others included Guthrie, 
 
14 CU CSAS Barlow 73/2: MICCI quoting a letter from the BPU in a letter to all members 25/03/1974 
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Waugh and Harrisons & Crosfield. Their involvement was mainly in large scale agriculture 
and the extraction of 'renewable natural resources', primarily palm oil and rubber. Until the 
late 1960s the Barlow family interests were controlled from London, primarily by the elderly 
brothers Sir John Barlow and Thomas B. Barlow, who were the directors of Thomas B. 
Barlow and Bro. (TB&B). Foremost among the holdings was a large share (17 per cent 
equity) of the Highlands Group of companies. Thomas Barlow (TBB) served as chairman of 
the Highlands & Lowlands (H&L), at the centre of the Highlands Group.15  
TB&B was a family owned partnership providing secretarial services in London to 
quoted rubber and palm oil estates, exclusively in Malaysia. As well as H&L, the family 
owned interests in many of the companies in the secretariat. A network of cross-holdings 
between these companies made the financial arrangements complex for an outsider to easily 
comprehend. 
A restructuring of the Barlow interests, representing a major change in their approach 
to Malaysian agriculture, occurred during 1966 when the Barlow holdings were merged with 
those of the Boustead Group. Boustead ran a successful trading operation in Singapore16, 
with (amongst other businesses) a smaller and less profitable business in Malaysian rubber & 
oil palm horticulture. Conversely, the Barlows had a strong and successful representation in 
Malaysian estates management, but their Singapore trading operations were limited. The 
restructuring saw Boustead take control of the Barlows' Singapore trading business and the 
Malaysian plantation businesses were combined into a new entity called Barlow Boustead 
 
15 Peyman (1981) 
16 Singapore followed an export orientated manufacturing strategy post-independence (White 2017). The 





Estates Agency Sendirian Berhad (BBEA or occasionally 'Barbeal'). The Barlows owned 65 
per cent of BBEA, with the Boustead Group owning the remaining 35 per cent.  
Drabble and Drake17 describe how a series of similar mergers between British 
businesses occurred in Malaysia between 1960 and 1967, including the merger of Guthrie 
Singapore and Henry Waugh Limited to create Guthrie-Waugh Berhad. The authors link the 
rationalisation of businesses to increased uncertainty in affairs international caused by the end 




Figure 1 – BBEA Ownership Structure (1970)18 
A – see table 1 for ownership structure, B – These consisted mainly of ‘Barlow London Group’ which was a group of 
smaller plantation owning and operating companies in East Asia 
  
 
17 Drabble and Drake (1981) 




Capital Held by BBEA (1975) Directly by BBEA Through Kaula Sidim 
East English Sdn Bhd 100% - 
Selugra Palm Oil Factory Sdn Bhd 100% - 
Kuala Sidim Rubber Co Bhd19 53.9% - 
Bekoh Holdings Ltd 6.5% 65% 
Selangor Coconuts Bhd 1.2% 56.5% 
Bukit Mertajam Rubber Co Ld - 100% 
Kedah Oil Palms Bhd 0.2% 49.9% 
 
Table 1 – BBEA Ownership of Smaller Plantation Companies (1975)20 
As an agency house, BBEA had two primary sources of revenue; the first was fees as 
an agency and the second was from dividends paid by land-owning subsidiaries, to which 
BBEA provided agency services (this stream of revenue only became significant in 1971 and 
grew with the acquisition of the financially challenged Kuala Sidim Group). BBEA did not 
own any land itself, instead it provided plantation management services to land owned by 
individuals or other organisations. Depending on the needs of clients, the services offered by 
BBEA spanned the entire value chain: research and development, plantation management, 
equipment hire and repairs, harvesting, storage, sales and land valuation. Work was carried 
out by visiting agents and engineers, agency businesses benefited from economies of scale by 
being able to spread experienced agents across many plantations. In some cases it would be 
heavily involved in a client’s business, often to the extent of providing management support 
 
19 The Kuala Sidim Group of companies only came fully under BBEA control in 1973, the group had become 
financially over-extended and needed support from the Barlow family name to maintain bank overdrafts 




to the company’s board. In 1967, 97 per cent of revenue came from commission charged for 
agency services.21 Between 1966 and 1974, BBEA became established as a land owner 
through investments in and acquisitions of land owning companies. By 1975 BBEA owned 
M$18,000,000 in land through subsidiaries (See table 1 for the ownership structure).  
British-owned businesses in Malaysia had traditionally been controlled from offices in 
London and, in its early years, BBEA was no exception. The key figures were Gordon Lang 
(Managing Director until his retirement in 1972 and replaced by G. S. Macdonald), Thomas 
Bradwall Barlow, representing the Barlow ownership, his son Henry Barlow, the finance 
director, and Alan Charton, Chairman of Boustead Holdings. Along with managers and 
visiting agents in Malaysia, who were usually British expatriates, these men dictated both the 
strategy and operations of the firm.  
This began to change in 1968, when Henry Barlow moved to Malaysia, and his role 
expanded from finance director to unofficial chief executive, as he became responsible for 
most of the operational decision making. In 1971, Thomas gifted to his son, Henry, his stake 
in BBEA (the Barlow shares had originally been owned 50-50 by Thomas and Sir John 
Barlow), solidifying control in Malaysia.  
First Reactions Malaysianisation 
 Drabble and Drake, writing while the final form of Malaysianisation was still taking 
shape, describe how the NEP was initially met with a high degree of uncertainty amongst 
foreign investors.22 The Malaysian Government failed to make clear what was meant by the 
concept of ‘increased participation’ and to what extent the concept was to be legally 
enforced, rather than being a guideline. Most businesses reacted by relocating their legal and 
 
21 CU CSAS Barlow 66: BBEA Accounts 1967 
22 Drabble and Drake (1981) 
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tax bases to Malaysia, doing so on the belief that participation could be achieved by 
becoming a Malaysian business (at least to some extent). 
Other common courses of action in 1971 and 1972 were new issues of shares on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange by foreign businesses and the reorganisation of foreign 
businesses under Malaysian incorporated holding companies. Many interpreted participation 
to mean leadership and employment, thus sought to appoint Malaysians to their boards of 
directors and increase employment amongst their staff. Throughout this early period, the 
Malaysian Government was still deciding which direction to take with the policy and how to 
enforce that, as was discussed by Tengku Razaleigh above.  
BBEA followed the course of most foreign-owned businesses during this time. They 
had already relocated their headquarters to Kuala Lumpur and accompanied this with 
appointing new Malaysian directors. Their staff had consisted of mostly expatriates as 
visiting agents and engineers, a general shift began to take place towards the employment of 
more native Malaysians. They did not need to reorganise under a Malaysian holding company 
as, unlike some other agency businesses, BBEA was already incorporated in Malaysia. 
However, most of these actions can be considered delaying tactics, aimed at appeasing the 
Government whilst making little commitment to follow through with the requirements of the 
NEP. The next section of this paper uses the documents from the Cambridge University 
Archives to describe the first true steps towards Malaysianisation.  
Initial Engagement in Malaysianisation 
As pressure grew to Malaysianise, the managers and owners of BBEA were forced to 
face the decision of whether to engage in the process or to attempt to continue to delay. This 
section of the paper analyses how the management dealt with this decision and how the 
government used its power to make foreign-investors comply with its requirements. It is 
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sufficient to assume that the true decision-making process did not start until 1974, as above, 
when pressure from the Government and the MICCI forced companies to produce 
Malaysianisation blue-prints. It may seem that the managers and owners of BBEA did not 
have the ability to choose whether or not to engage in the Malaysianisation process, however, 
other options (such as immediate sale of the company) did exist and understanding this initial 
decision is important to understanding those that follow.  
As part of the NEP, from 1973 companies seeking to make investments of more than 
M$1,000,000 would be deemed to be expanding and were required to apply to both the 
Government’s Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) and the Capital Issues Committee 
(CIC)23 for permission if they did not comply with the required 30:40:30 ownership ratio.24 
This posed a threat to BBEA if they chose to continue to delay or avoid Malaysianisation; 
they were responsible for the maintenance of stores, equipment and plantations, all of which 
required regular and significant investment. Local Malaysian civil servants were particularly 
alert to investments by businesses that did not meet the participation requirements. According 
to the Wall Street Journal: 
One company here [in Malaysia] burned out a piece of equipment and sought an 
import license for a new one, but officials ruled the company was expanding and 
asked pointed questions about plans for Bumiputra shareholders.25 
Threatened with challenges for spending anything more than 1 or 2 per cent of 
turnover, the pressure was mounting on the management of BBEA to begin the process of 
Malaysianisation. However, the managers and owners appear to have been concerned with 
 
23 Investors regarded the CIC as a tougher organisation to pass investments, due to its direct Tun Ismal Mohd 
Ali, who (Henry observed) had a reputation for playing ‘Hard Cop’ with foreign companies. 
24 CU CSAS Barlow 73/1: Memorandum from PM Varghese to CR Brown and Henry Barlow 25/03/1974 
25 Wall Street Journal (1975). 
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the potential capital gains tax liability that such a sale could generate. The owners sought 
advice on the tax implications of selling shares in Malaysia, although BBEA was Malaysian 
incorporated, if the shares were sold directly for cash by the existing shareholders, they 
would be liable for capital gains tax at the UK rate (30 per cent at the time). In a 
memorandum to the board of TB&B regarding this issue, dated May 1974, Henry Barlow sets 
out possible options for a reorganisation of the Barlow Group that would bring all the 
ownership under a Malaysian-based entity, allowing for negotiations with the Malaysian 
Government regarding tax.26  
The decision facing BBEA in mid-1974 was a choice between two options, either to 
openly engage in the Malaysianisation process or to avoid doing so - by delaying or by 
disposing of the business. Considering, the outcomes of the options open to them, disposal of 
the business is ruled out by management due to the growth potential and the high CGT bill 
that would be realised. Delaying the process is initially considered attractive, certainly this is 
the approach taken by most foreign-owned businesses between 1971 and 1974, however, this 
risks a decline in the value of assets due to the inability to make any large investments.27 The 
appeal of this delay decision appeared to be that, if the Malaysian regime underwent a 
substantial change, priorities might change from equity participation to other forms of 
participation, or other issues altogether. Henry Barlow raises the possibility of this in 
personal correspondence with family and friends during early 1974.28 The choice to openly 
accept Malaysianisation is initially considered less appealing than a continued delay, 
requiring reorganisation of the ownership structure and a loss of total control of the business 
by the Barlows and Bousteads. However, by openly engaging in the process, there would be 
 
26 CU CSAS Barlow 73/2: Memorandum “Notes on Reorganisation” from Henry to TB&B Ltd board 
20/05/1974 
27 Yacob and Khalid (2012): Table 2: “The New Economic Policy: Foreign Business Strategies and Outcomes” 
28 CU University Library (UL) Barlow 209: “Personal Correspondence, 1973-4” 
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no limit on investment in the business. Henry, who of all the owners and managers appears to 
have been most in favour of Malaysianisation, writes to his father, Thomas, in April 1974 
arguing that Malaysian investors may bring more revenue by favouring BBEA over other 
agencies to manage their land investments.29 
The decision to actively and openly pursue Malaysianisation was made in September 
1974, with a memorandum dated 14th September indicating a decision had been made and 
providing a roadmap for the process: ‘The problem will be divided into 2 stages: (1) 
Ascertaining what is the correct vehicle for the Bumiputra participation, and setting this 
vehicle up. (2) Achieving correct participation on the right terms.’30 
This two-stage process indicates the decision points that will be the basis of the 
following sections of this paper. It is challenging to assess, in isolation, the short-term 
outcome of the decision to Malaysianise, as the actual outcomes of the process depend 
heavily on how the process is undertaken (for example, what form each of the two-steps 
takes). However, an analysis of the accounts of BBEA over 1974 and 1975 demonstrates that 
management were highly uncertain about impact of the decision on the company’s finances, 
increasing the "provision for contingencies" in 1974/5 financial year. The following sections 
will consider influences on, and outcomes of, the decisions that set the parameters of the 
Malaysianisation process. 
The Malaysianisation Process 
The form of Malaysianisation represents the setting of three parameters: When? Who? 
and What Price? ‘When’ refers to the timescale for the process; although the NEP stipulated 
 
29 CU UL Barlow 106: Letter from Henry to TBB 17/04/1975 




1990 as the deadline, there was significant pressure to shrink the timescale to be as short as 
possible. ‘Who’ refers to who the participants would be on the Malaysian side, and ‘What 
Price’ refers to the price per share and any discount against market value that would be 
offered. This section considers the setting of each of these parameters individually. 
When? 
After having decided to Malaysianise, the managers of BBEA made the Malaysian 
officials aware of their intention to comply with the NEP deadline of 1990. The blue-print 
was to offer 20 per cent in 1975 and 10 per cent in 1980, with the plan that this would prevent 
any single investor immediately gaining control over 30 per cent of the company. However, 
this plan was not accepted by Malaysian civil servants, who, as a Wall Street Journal article 
explained: 
…seemed intent on enforcing the 30-40-30 rule not by 1990, but now, and not for 
whole economy, but for each individual company. Foreign investors say harassment is 
continuous in an apparent effort to force changes in equity structure.31 
Although BBEA had set out a clear plan to Malaysianise ten years before the apparent 
Government deadline, the management were confronted with the reality that an offer of 30 
per cent immediately would be the only acceptable terms. 32 
The sale of a 30 per cent share would lead to an ownership structure of 45 per cent 
Barlow, 25 per cent Boustead and 30 per cent Malaysian. The Barlows and the Bousteads 
made it clear that they would prefer to divide the Malaysian share between multiple 
 
31 Wall Street Journal (1975) 
32 CU CSAS Barlow 74/1: Letter from Tuan Abdul Aziz bin Eaji Taha (Bank Negara Malaysia) to Mr G 
McDonald (Chairman of BBEA), 06/08/1975 
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institutions or individuals to ensure they remained the two largest single shareholders. The 
next sub-section discusses the extent to which this was possible. 
Who? 
The Malaysianisation process was heavily controlled by the Malaysian Government, 
to the extent that institutions could only hold shares as representatives of Malaysians if they 
had Government approval. In August 1975, only four institutions had permission from the 
Government, these were: Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS, ‘The National Corporation’), 
Tabung Haji (‘The Pilgrims’ Fund’), Tabung Tentera (‘The Military Pension Fund’) and the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). The number would grow quickly through 
1976 and 1977 as PERNAS established subsidiaries to target the Malaysianisation of specific 
industries. PERNAS and FELDA invested public money in foreign businesses, the other 
funds were pension and investment funds that invested private money with government 
support.  
The owners of BBEA decided that offering shares to institutions would be a more 
effective strategy than an offer to investors on the open market, through the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, as it would allow them greater control of the process.33 In August 1975 it 
was agreed by the board of BBEA to offer 20 per cent (or 30 per cent, “depending on 
negotiations”) to Tabung Haji. 34This was not the Barlows’ preferred situation, as it led to 
one investor holding a sizeable proportion of the company, but it had become apparent that 
Tabung Haji were the only one of the four institutions with the available capital to purchase 
the shares. A price was set (see below) and a share agreement was drafted, with Tabung Haji 
 
33 BBEA sought Malay institutional investors rather than Chinese participation since the NEP was designed to 
increase Malay participation in the economy. Moreover, the general presumption was that the Malay authorities 
would not have allowed Malaysian Chinese to be brought in as partners. 




now taking 30 per cent. The agreement also stipulated that Barlow Boustead Estates Agency 
be given first refusal on the management of all land acquired by Tabung Haji in the future.35 
The shares sold to Tabung Haji would come from an enlarged share capital, rather than from 
the Barlow and Boustead holding companies, meaning the sale would not trigger capital gains 
(and therefore tax) for the original owners.  
The draft agreement was approved by BBEA and Tabung Haji on 22nd September 
1975, but by March 1976 the sale was yet to take place. Henry Barlow wrote to a friend who 
was on the board of Plantation Agencies Sdn Bhd, and was experiencing some 
Malaysianisation challenges of his own: 
I am sorry to hear you are having trouble, but then so are we: we still cannot persuade 
the Pilgrim Fathers [Tabung Haji] to part with their cash, although they continue to 
maintain that they are anxious to participate. On this basis, I do not think you need to 
be unduly worried about getting out of step on participation, but you may be right to 
feel that it is not best to press the issue for the time being….36 
This note alludes to a serious problem that threatened to undermine the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy; the Government had pushed the purchase of 
equity too far, leading to a lack of capital. In a letter written in response to an article in the 
Sunday Times that supported the NEP and claimed that it was not undermining investment in 
Malaysia, Henry Barlow wrote: 
The NEP… has gone sadly awry because of attempts in the last 6 months to push the 
policy too far and too fast. This was tacitly admitted by Tan Sri Ismail [Governor of 
 
35 Tabung Haji was already a client of BBEA via the Sungei Mengah Estate in Pahang. 




Bank Negara, negotiating on behalf of Tabung Haji] when he stated that there was 
insufficient Malay capital to take up what was an offer at agreed prices (cf BBEA 
experience).37 
Henry goes on to say: 
The political problems of a slowdown in the pace of Malay participation are 
appreciated, but then political demagoguery serves no-ones’ long term interests. 
However, at the present rate, the nose is being cut off to spite the face.38 
The Barlows had never been particularly warm to the idea of Malaysianisation, but 
this note makes their feelings abundantly clear. Having been forced to sell shares, then forced 
to sell more shares than initially planned, they then found themselves facing an investor who 
could not afford them regardless. It was not until over a year after the initial slow-down in the 
sale that Tabung Haji finally dropped out of the process, proposing that another Malaysian 
institution may be able to afford the shares instead: 
Henry received a phone call from Tan Sri Ismail indicating that Tabung Haji would 
not be able to take up the shares, Ismail wished to see these placed and asked… if 
they would accept Pernas Securities instead.”39 
Tabung Haji purchased shares using funds provided primarily by Malaysian Muslims 
paying monthly subscriptions to build up reserves to fund a pilgrimage to Mecca, whereas 
PERNAS was financed by the Malaysian Government and primarily used loans backed by 
 
37 CU CSAS Barlow 74/2: Henry Memorandum to the BBEA board, “Investment Confidence in Malaysia”, 
20/10/1976 
38 CU CSAS Barlow 74/2: Henry Memorandum to the BBEA board, “Investment Confidence in Malaysia”, 
20/10/1976. ‘The nose being cut off to spite the face’ is an English idiom referring to needless self-destructive 
over-reaction to a problem. 
39 CU CSAS Barlow 74/2: Minutes of BBEA Board Meeting, 10/11/1976. Pernas Securities Sdn Bhd was a 




tax payers’ money. The board of BBEA felt that PERNAS were likely to be able to produce 
the cash needed and agreed to take two weeks to consider the proposal from Ismail. The 
advice from Henry to the board was that “Ultimately, it would be imprudent to turn down 
such a proposal”.40 
Once the details of the PERNAS offer had been reviewed by the board of BBEA, it 
became apparent the offer was on better terms than the original Tabung Haji offer. Whereas 
Tabung Haji had insisted on adding two new board members to BBEA to represent their 
interests, PERNAS intended to hold the shares as an investment only and wanted no 
influence over the day-to-day management of the agency. The loss of Tabung Haji also meant 
the loss of the potential for the land they would bring under BBEA management. PERNAS 
was unlikely to acquire land directly because their founding purpose was the purchase of 
equity in foreign-owned businesses. However, PERNAS did own just under 10 per cent in the 
Highlands group, which had 70,000 acres of land under BBEA’s management. Despite their 
claims to not exert influence on the companies they owned, the new Highlands group 
chairman was in place mainly due to PERNAS’ support.  
A letter from Henry Barlow to Ian Sandbach, Managing Director of France Fenwick 
Ltd, an insurance company that insured BBEA’s goods, describes the opportunities and 
challenges presented by this new offer: 
We believe that this offer provides a chance of tying our largest principal [Highlands 
Group] more securely to us and, although we are less than happy at the semi-political 
nature of the animal, on balance we must agree. The Bousteads, I know, will not be 
 
40 CU CSAS Barlow 74/2: Minutes of BBEA Board Meeting, 10/11/1976. Pernas Securities Sdn Bhd was a 




enthusiastic, but I think that if the Barlows present a united front then they will 
accede.41 
The Bousteads, being the minority shareholder in BBEA, remained concerned that the 
sale of 30 per cent of the company to a single institution would undermine their influence. 
Alan Charton, Chairman of Boustead Holdings, proposed an alternative plan: Boustead 
Holdings had already Malaysianised substantially, selling shares to Tabung Tentera and 
FELDA (each owning 25 per cent equity). Writing to Henry and Thomas, he explained the 
details of his plan: 
As Boustead Holdings Berhad have now met the requirements of the Malaysian 
Government in terms of Malaysianisation, perhaps it might be desirable if we made an 
effort to persuade the Governor and the other Authorities concerned that the taking up 
of these shares by Boustead Holdings would provide for a more solidly based 
organisation….42 
  Charton’s strategy was that, instead of selling shares to PERNAS, the Malaysian 
Government might be persuaded to allow the Bousteads to take a total 55 per cent share in 
BBEA. This would bring the agency under majority ownership of a Malaysianised investor 
(since Boustead holdings was now Malaysianised). Charton wrote a detailed explanation of 
how such a plan could benefit both BBEA and the wider Barlow holdings in a letter to 
Thomas and Henry Barlow. 
This offer was not deemed acceptable by the Barlows, who preferred the closer ties to 
the Highlands group (which the family also held shares in) over losing majority control to the 
 
41 CU CSAS Barlow 73/3: Letter from Henry to Ian Sandbach, “Barlow Boustead Insurance”, 03/11/1976 




Bousteads. Charton strongly disagreed with the Barlows’ plan, arguing that, despite what the 
Government had told BBEA, PERNAS were unlikely to be able to take up the shares at a 
good price: 
I do not believe, at this stage, that the suggestion [to sell to PERNAS] was motivated 
by PERNAS’ involvement in Highlands and Lowlands affairs. I would go so far as to 
suggest that they surely cannot be seriously interested in holding equity of a small 
agency operation such as Barlow Boustead.43 
Henry Barlow describes this as a “time of tension between the Barlows and 
Bousteads”.44 The Barlows, with their larger representation on the board and their larger 
shareholding, pushed forward with the sale to PERNAS during December 1976. However, to 
great frustration amongst the Barlows, Charton was proved right; PERNAS did not have the 
funds to buy the shares and there was no prospect of them being in a position to buy the 
shares for at least a year.45 They recommended that BBEA consider a combined offer from 
Tabung Haji, Tabung Tentera and FELDA in their place (each taking 10 per cent equity).  
The board had been thrown from institution to institution by the Malaysian 
Government, as the lack of capital to push the NEP as fast as desired began to undermine 
civil servants’ ambitions. The Federal Government had delegated the implementation of the 
policy to investment institutions and local officials, whose personal ambitions and hunger for 
a quick profit had almost caused the collapse of the NEP. Articles in the Sunday Times,46 the 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Interview with Dato’ Henry Sackville Barlow, 02/08/2019 
45 CU CSAS Barlow 74/1: Letter from Sheikh Mahmud bin Ali (Tabung Haji) to Henry, “30% shares in Barlow 
Boustead Estates Agency Sendirian Berhad”, 31/12/1976 




Daily Telegraph47 and the Wall Street Journal48 all comment on the damaged investor climate 
in Malaysia and competition presented by Indonesia and China.  
With the three institutions approved by the board, negotiations accelerated 
considerably. A formal agreement regarding price and number of shares was in place by 29th 
December 1976. 49 New shares were to be issued, bringing the total number to 8,575,000 and 
the existing shareholders all waived their right to buy these shares in order to allow them to 
be sold to the Malaysian institutions. On 5th January 1977 the question of ‘Who’ was finally 
answered when the shares were sold to the triad of Tabung Haji, Tabung Tentera and 
FELDA.50After two years of trying it was third time lucky for the Malaysianisation of BBEA. 
 
Figure 2 – BBEA Ownership after Malaysianisation (January 1977)51 
What Price? 
 
47 Daily Telegraph 5 December 1974 
48 Wall Street Journal (1975) 
49 CU CSAS Barlow 74/1: Letter from Mark H. D. Barlow (MHDB) to Henry containing a summary of telex 
and phone conversations regarding the formal share agreement, 14/01/1977 
50 CU CSAS Barlow 74/1: Letter from Henry to Gordon McDonald, “Bumiputra Participcation in BBEA Sdn. 
Bhd.”, 24/01/1977 
51 Far Eastern Economic Review (1981) 
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In any sale of shares, be it a public or private offering, the question of setting the price 
involves forecasting, estimation and negotiation. The Malaysian Government stipulated, in a 
letter to businesses dated 25 February 1975, that: 
All matters pertaining to the valuation of assets and the price of shares to be offered in 
the transactions involved as a result of the reconstruction shall be determined by the 
Capital Issues Committee (CIC).”52 
The CIC appointed Bank Negara to make an independent valuation of BBEA. Using 
an assets-per-share price model, where the total assets of the company are divided by the 
number of shares, a price of M$1.29 per share was reached. This gave BBEA a total value of 
approximately M$11,000,000. However, Henry Barlow argued that this represented the 
absolute minimum value of the business and did not consider future earnings and dividend 
payments. As such, Bank Negara revised their suggested price to M$1.35 per share. This 
meant an increase in the value of BBEA of around M$500,000 to include future earnings.53 
This change was not sufficient for Henry, who wrote to the board: ‘On the basis of earnings, 
assumed to be a sustainable level of $3,000,000 per year, it is not unreasonable to argue that 
the shares should be worth rather more.’54 He suggested that a more appropriate price per 
share would be between M$1.57 and M$1.67, increasing the value of the company to 
approximately $2,000,000 more than the CIC price.  
Protracted negotiations between Bank Negara and Henry failed to change the price 
offered for the shares, with the bank and the CIC referring to discounts of 10 per cent or 
 
52 CU CSAS Barlow 74/1: Letter from Tuan Abdul Aziz bin Eaji Taha (Bank Negara Malaysia) to G McDonald 
(Chairman of BBEA), 06/08/1975 
53 Ibid. 
54 CU CSAS Barlow 70/1: Memorandum from Henry to the BBEA board, “Background to the Valuation of 




higher over true value that were expected for Malaysianisation.55  In November 1976, days 
before PERNAS dropped out of the purchase (as described above), the price was formally 
agreed at M$1.35 per share. This was described as M$1.29 share of underlying value in the 
business and M$0.06 per share in ‘goodwill’ to include future potential.56 
The number of shares was increased from 6,000,000 to 8,575,000 with the new 
offering split equally between Tabung Haji, Tabung Tentera and FELDA. The total price paid 
was M$3,476,250 which valued BBEA in total at M$11,576,250. 
Strained Relations: The Future of the Barlow Interest in BBEA 
Over 2 years of negotiation, prevarication and difficulty, BBEA had undergone the 
Malaysianisation in a single move on 6th January 1977. The process had put severe strain on 
the relationship between the Barlows and Bousteads. The Bousteads had put pressure on the 
Barlows to reorganise BBEA to give them a greater shareholding, as discussed above. When 
this failed, they continued attempts to persuade the Barlows that greater Barlow-Boustead 
unity would be mutually beneficial. The Boustead Group had been reorganised to make more 
financial support available for future ventures in Malaysia, but the Barlow Group did not 
have the same assets, creating a sticking point between the partners.57 
One particular point of contention was over the purchase of shares in the ‘Barlow 
London Group’ by BBEA, which would have allowed the smaller companies that the 
Barlows owned in Malaysia to meet the participation requirements. In 1975, the Bousteads 
had been accepting of this plan, but by 1977 their position had changed, apparently strongly 
 
55 The expected discount on the true value was partly due to the Malaysian government policy of allowing 
foreign investors to repatriate the sale proceeds in cash from divestments in Malaysian assets. 
56 CU CSAS Barlow 73/3: Memorandum from Henry to the BBEA board “Bumiputra Participation & Barbeal 
Management”, 20/11/1976 





influenced by their Malaysian shareholders. Alan Charton, representing the Boustead interest, 
said that such an investment could not be allowed to go ahead due to a lack of capital, but 
particularly due to the lack of planning and careful management presented by the Barlows. 58  
The final blow in the power struggle between the Bousteads, the Barlows and the 
Malaysian institutions came on 23rd January 1979. An extract from the minutes of the BBEA 
board meeting (including hand-written corrections by Henry Barlow) explain what happened 
and demonstrate the high level of tension: 
5. Any Other Business: Mr. Macdonald [Chairman of BBEA] reported that he had 
received a private letter from Mr. Charton [Boustead representative] indicating that 
the three Malay institutional shareholders in Barlow Boustead had offered their 
Barlow Boustead shares to Boustead Holdings Berhad on the basis of one Boustead 
Holdings share and $1.45 in cash for each share held by them and that they had 
accepted the offer. The letter further recorded that Boustead Holdings Berhad would 
accept any further offers of shares from member of the Barlow family on the same 
terms. Mr. Charton explained that it might be a further 2 weeks before all the formal 
approvals had been received, after which a time limit would be given for the 
remaining shareholders to decide whether to offer their shares on the same terms, or 
to remain as Barlow Boustead shareholders.  
Mr. H. S. Barlow remarked that a private letter of this nature did not appear prima 
facie to comply with the relevant articles of association (No.37) governing the transfer 
of shares. He had informed that Counsel’s opinion had been sought on this point and 
that Counsel had confirmed that the procedures were correct.  
 




Mr H. S. Barlow recorded his regret that matters had turned out this way, but accepted 
noted [Henry correction in pencil] that this was a majority decision.59 
This arrangement would give the Malaysian institutions control of Boustead Holdings 
and a majority share in BBEA. The Barlows would own 45 per cent of BBEA, with Henry 
himself owning 22.5 per cent and the other 22.5 per cent held by Sir John Barlow’s sons 
(Henry’s cousins) as indicated in figure 3. The critical decision was; What do the Barlows do 
about BBEA? An important aspect of this decision is whether the Barlows act together, or 
whether Henry and the other family members will deviate in their decisions. Henry was the 
only member of the Barlow family engaged in running the business day-to-day. Having 
moved to Kuala Lumpur and built up BBEA, he clearly felt enough attachment to the firm to 
want to continue his involvement. His cousins, however, had a more distant relationship with 
BBEA, contributing very little to the day-to-day running of the firm from London. The 
frustration with the in-fighting among foreign investors was felt more acutely in London.  
Negotiations to find alternative courses of action took place rapidly throughout late 
January 1979 and the Barlows eventually faced a choice between three possible options: 
(1) Sell the BBEA share to Boustead Holdings Berhad on the terms detailed above 
(2) Continue to hold their shares in BBEA, but have a minority stake 
(3) Offer the BBEA shares to the Highlands Group 
The option of an offer to Highlands, who were a major plantation owner, emerged when they 
expressed an interest in building up their own estate management capability. Suspecting that 
owning a large share in BBEA might provide a faster solution to their needs, Henry had 
enquired about their interest and received a warm response. Unwilling to sell their shares to 
 
59 CU CSAS Barlow 71/2: BBEA board meeting minutes 23/01/1979, annotated 
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the Bousteads, as an apparent retaliation for the underhand tactics they had used to gain 
control of the group, the Barlows considered a sale to the Highlands Group a more favourable 
option. With the Barlows also holding a 10 per cent share in Highlands, this option would 
also consolidate the Barlows Malaysian interests to some extent. 60 
 
 
Figure 3 – Ownership of BBEA as proposed by Alan Charton in 1979.  
After months of consideration and negotiation, the other Barlows decided that selling 
the shares to Highlands group or another Malaysian investor would be their best option. 
Henry, however, had made the decision to continue to own his share in BBEA and to stay on 
the board as a director. He even considered an attempt to become chairman of the board. This 
caused frustration amongst the Barlows, and concern from his father, who wrote to Henry in 
June 1979: 
… I feel you should consider selling your shares in Barbeal [BBEA] as well so that 
the name of the company can be changed, even if you stay on as an employee and 
director of Barbeal. Mark’s [Barlow, son of Sir John and director of Barlow Holdings] 
 
60 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Henry Memorandum to the TB&B board, “BBEA”, 20/02/1979 
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parting words to me were that if you keep in touch with him direct, this might go a 
long way to resolving present difficulties and misunderstandings. 
 This whole matter requires thought and discussion if you desire to remain in 
Barbeal and try to become a supremo there. You will not want to find yourself with 
all the responsibility, but little authority or power, which will probably rest with the 
Malays!61 
By the time the Barlows made their decision the offer from Boustead Holdings had 
expired. Yet, with Henry not considering selling his stake and thus not helping to orchestrate 
the deal with the Highlands group that he had been the chief architect of, the Barlows were 
forced to go to the Malaysian Government to dispose of the shares.  
The Malaysianisation process had built up significant momentum between 1975 and 
1979. Returns from previous investments were building up the spending power of the 
Malaysian institutions, in particular PERNAS, and the civil servants running the funds were 
keen to see them spent. Thus, when the Barlows approached the Government with an offer of 
an additional 45 per cent share in BBEA, it was warmly received and a process to value the 
shares began. 
As with the first round of Malaysianisation, the CIC (Capital Issues Committee) was 
called upon to value the shares in BBEA. This time reaching a value of M$2.79 per share, 
double the value from the first round, reflecting the 200 per cent revenue growth since 1975 
and clearly an attractive offer to the Barlows.62 This also alludes to the increased spending 
capabilities of the Malaysian institutions, now that they were less strapped for cash they 
 
61 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Letter from TBB to Henry, 20/06/1979 
62 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Letter from Tuan Ahmad Bin Sidek (Pernas Group Controller of Planning and 
Development) to Henry, 20/09/1979 
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could afford to offer more favourable terms to foreign investors. PERNAS was selected as 
the institution that would make the investment. 
This sale was not well received by the Bousteads, who were intent on gaining 100 per 
cent of BBEA. In the latest round of boardroom battles between the Barlows and the 
Bousteads, Alan Charton attempted to block the sale, and the Boustead offer was put back on 
the table: 
Mr. Charton stated that he understood a memorandum on the subject had been 
submitted to the Prime Minister and regretted that shares were being offered to 
PERNAS. He stated that he would not be prepared to allow more than 22.5% of 
BBEA shares to fall into PERNAS hands…. He thought the Barlow family would 
wish to reconsider the proposals previously made by Boustead Holdings.63 
The Barlows rejected this offer from the Bousteads, believing that there was sufficient 
interest from Malaysian institutions in BBEA that they could get a better price. Henry felt 
that the Bousteads could have more to give if the Barlows were prepared to negotiate, but the 
hostility that had developed between the different parties made such discussions unlikely. In 
1979, PERNAS emerged as a potential buyer of the Barlow shares. Negotiations centred on 
the future of BBEA’s major agency contracts, particularly with Highlands & Lowlands 
(H&L), their largest customer.  
PERNAS, which owned just under 10 per cent of H&L (which was Malaysianised 
earlier), was effectively able to use their control of H&L as leverage in the negotiations. The 
Barlows were prepared to sell to PERNAS, but Henry wanted a ‘put and call’ option on the 
shares. The option would have allowed Henry to sell his cousins’ shares to PERNAS with a 
 




call option to buy them back if H&L did not renew their BBEA contract. The put option 
allowed Henry to sell his stake in BBEA to PERNAS within seven years, at the same price.64 
It appears that the put and call option was a major sticking point in the negotiations, which 
dragged on until early 1982. Eventually the deal was abandoned as both parties failed to 
agree terms.65  
The collapse of the proposed PERNAS deal presented Boustead Holdings with 
another opportunity to persuade the Barlows to sell their shares to them.66 This time the 
Barlows were prepared to accept the Boustead offer whereby they would sell to Tabung 
Tentera and FELDA in cash. Tabung Tentera and FELDA would then swap their BBEA 
shares for Boustead shares. These transactions gave Boustead full control of BBEA. The sale 
was completed in October 1982, with Boustead Holdings taking control of BBEA and 
renaming it Boustead Estates Agency Sdn. Bhd.67 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the Malaysianisation of BBEA between 1970 and 1982, 
providing an in-depth of analysis that was previously not possible. In Yacob & Khalid (2012) 
the authors conclude that firms either adapted to Malaysianisation, through new joint 
ventures and expansion, or divested their Malaysian interests. The case of BBEA 
demonstrates that using such a dichotomy over-simplifies how investors reacted to 
Malaysianisation. In fact, the Barlows’ and BBEA went through three stages of response: 
Delay, Adapt, and Divest. Each strategy was adopted emergently in response the changing 
 
64 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Draft contract for sale of BBEA share to PERNAS 15/06/1981 
65 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Letters between Henry and investment bankers/lawyers. 14/06/1980 
66 CU CSAS Barlow 75/1: Letters between Henry and John K. Barlow, 1980-81 
67 Financial Times (25/10/1982) 
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position of the Malaysian Government. The process was not planned, each time the Barlows 
changed strategy they expected it to be the permanent solution. 
From 1970 to 1974 delay was the approach chosen by the Barlows; they were able to 
do little more than pay ‘lip-service’ to the NEP. There were no restrictions on investment and 
so no impact on the operations of the firm. The Government itself was not yet clear how the 
NEP would be implemented and how the concept of ‘participation’ would be interpreted.  
This changed in 1974 when the pressure on foreign investors to release equity 
increased and restrictions on investments came into place. The Barlows could no longer delay 
and chose to adapt rather than divest. They interpreted the simple requirement for 30 per cent 
Bumiputra participation by 1990 at face value and set out a plan to achieve it, but in the first 
of several inconsistent moves by the Government their timeline was shortened from ‘by 
1990’ to ‘as soon as possible’. Offering 30 per cent equity, BBEA was thrown from investor 
to investor as the ambition of Malaysian civil servants to buy foreign equity out-paced the 
size of their pockets. The lack of clear strategy by the Government soured investor relations, 
the damage done was irreparable.  
The Barlow’s perception of the Malaysian Government was weakened immeasurably 
further by the events of 1978 and 1979, when the Malaysian funds proposed to seize control 
of the Boustead group. Coupled with the policy of allowing divesting foreign investors to 
remit money out of the country, there was a clear incentive for the Barlows to get out. Thus, 
now left minority shareholding in most of their own group, by 1980 the Barlows had begun to 
re-organise and divest.  
When dealing with foreign investors, the Malaysian Government did not seek total 
divestment, instead using their ‘expanding cake’ theory in an attempt to persuade foreign 
business owners that partial nationalisation could be beneficial. The result of this policy of 
35 
 
‘soft nationalisation’ emerge above, as a smaller share of the growing economy led to in-
fighting amongst foreign investors. In-fighting in this case between the Barlows and 
Bousteads was fuelled by two counter-acting incentives. Firstly, divesting investors could 
remit money out of the country and so were incentivised to sell-up (and at a discount). 
Secondly, some investors were confident that the plantations would continue to be profitable 
under government ownership, so fought to grow their holdings by buying the discounted 
shares. Here Henry’s cousins pursued the former, whilst the Bousteads and Henry Barlow 
maintained confidence in the Government. An analysis of the accounts of BBEA supports 
these two stances taken by the shareholders. On the one hand, the BBEA accounts shows a 
growth in dividends from M$600,000 in 1974 to M$2,572,000 in 1980, reflecting a desire to 
cash out. On the other hand, the asset value of the firm grew by 50% over the same period, 
supportive of the desire to get the best valuation. The competition for ownership increased 
over time as a result of attempts to further increase participation by the Government. 
Eventually, it reached the point where the investment climate was no longer attractive to 
many foreign investors like the Barlows and nationalisation occurred by default. 
The paper contributes to an understanding of the motivations of a complex corporate 
divestment decision with an interplay of both politics and economics within the Malaysian 
government’s approach to soft nationalisation through the New Economic Policy. The 
question of whether the Malaysian Government could have increased participation without 
causing such divestment through a different approach to Malaysianisation is outside the scope 
of this paper but is an area for further research. Further research into the specific case of the 
Barlow Boustead Estates Agency could evaluate the quantitative impact of the events 
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